Preventing Deceptive Communications with Electors

4. Recommendations

The following measures and recommendations are aimed at better addressing the risks posed by deceptive tactics to Canada's electoral democracy. Some of the measures proposed here are administrative in nature and can be implemented by Elections Canada. Most recommendations, however, require legislative changes.

Both the measures and the recommendations are based on the view that, first and foremost, the focus must be on preventing this kind of conduct from occurring. In making the recommendations, Elections Canada is also mindful of the importance of limiting, to the extent possible, the regulatory burden imposed on political entities. At the same time, however, Canadians, political parties and candidates expect Elections Canada to be able to intervene promptly and effectively in investigating potential abuses of the electoral process. The ability to do so is essential to preserving confidence in electoral democracy and can only be achieved with the appropriate legislative tools.

A. Prevention measures and recommendations

Public information on the electoral process

As indicated earlier, Elections Canada is responsible for managing polling locations and ensuring that changes are communicated to electors. This communication is done through the mailing of new voter information cards or, if it is too late for such a mailing, through public announcements in the media and the posting of an election worker at the door of the old polling site.

Evidence suggests that Canadians do not understand the respective roles of Elections Canada and political parties in providing information about where and how they can vote. Indeed, 64% of electors thought it appropriate for political parties and candidates to provide them with this information.^Footnote 48 The responsibility of Elections Canada as regards the voting process needs to be clarified. Means must also be taken to reduce the risk of electors being given inaccurate information by candidates or parties, or worse, being deceived by callers impersonating Elections Canada officials. In preparing for the next election, the agency will therefore foster greater public awareness of its procedures (in particular, the fact that the agency does not communicate with electors by telephone), as well as develop means to warn electors about misleading calls and inform them of available remedies, including how to file a complaint with Elections Canada or with the CRTC, depending on the nature of the call.

In discussions with members of the Advisory Committee of Political Parties, many have told Elections Canada that they were not sufficiently informed of or did not fully understand the CRTC rules governing unsolicited telecommunications. Officials within the CRTC have already informally indicated a willingness to better communicate and explain these rules to political entities. Elections Canada will work with the CRTC in this endeavour.

A code of conduct for political entities

Another means of increasing Canadian electors' confidence in the political process and political parties (particularly as regards political entities' use of their personal information), which garnered a broad consensus from the panel of experts consulted by Elections Canada, is the development of a code of ethics or code of conduct^Footnote 49 for political parties – one to which they would either voluntarily adhere or that could be mandated through legislation.

In its 1991 report, the Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing ("the Lortie Commission") strongly recommended that parties adopt codes of ethics as a remedy to the concern that "where incidents or allegations of misbehaviour arise, parties have been reluctant to assume responsibility for reviewing and revising the practices that gave rise to the allegations."^Footnote 50 As stated by the Lortie Commission, "[a] code of ethics would establish an important organizational instrument of party governance, giving party executives and leadership a tool to manage and give coherence to the behaviour, practices and standards of the party."^Footnote 51 It also expressed the view that

[c]rystallizing the party's basic values and principles in a code of ethics would be particularly valuable to party members who make difficult decisions in the competitive environment of electoral campaigns. It would enhance the incentive and inclination of party members to put the party's long-term interest in protecting its integrity and public respect ahead of potential and illusive short-term gains.^Footnote 52

For the Commission, "[a] code of ethics would help reconcile public demands for greater regulation with the legitimate desire of parties to manage their internal affairs."^Footnote 53 It also insisted on the need for parties to enforce their own codes and suggested the setting up of an ethics committee to ensure compliance.^Footnote 54

While the Lortie Commission suggested that each party have and administer its own code of ethics, Elections Canada's research also provided examples of codes of ethics or conduct to which all parties within a particular jurisdiction adhere (or by which they are bound).

The organization International IDEA, the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance,^Footnote 55 proposes a model voluntary code of conduct setting out "rules of behaviour for political parties and their supporters relating to their participation in an election process".^Footnote 56

Even though authors generally see voluntary codes as the best solution,^Footnote 57 codes of conduct may be developed in a number of ways and may be quite different in nature. They may be agreed on by the parties, or agreed on by the parties and then given legal status; they may be legislated, or they may be determined by the electoral management body pursuant to a regulatory authority.^Footnote 58

It is a common view among authors and in the codes reviewed that a code should be applicable to the party itself and, through the control of each party, to its leader, officials, candidates and members. To the extent possible, a party should be responsible for the activities of its supporters. It should also be responsible for violations of the code by its supporters.^Footnote 59

While codes of conduct for political parties have been adopted mainly in emerging democracies,^Footnote 60 an example of such a code has existed in Manitoba for the last decade.^Footnote 61

In the federal sphere, this code (or codes) could be developed in collaboration with parties and, as is the case in all jurisdictions where such codes exist, bind not only the parties but also their officials, candidates, other entities and active supporters.

B. Recommendations to improve compliance

Extension of the application of privacy protection principles to political parties

The survey of electors referred to in part 2 of this report reflects the concerns of the individuals canvassed with respect to the collection and use of their personal information by political parties. More than 75% of the electors surveyed felt that they should have the right to "opt out" of communications from political entities. As well, 69% of electors disagreed with the view that it is important for political parties to be able to collect personal information on electors.^Footnote 62 When asked what is more important, the right of political entities to communicate with electors or the right of electors to protect their privacy, two thirds expressed the view that preserving their privacy is of greater importance.^Footnote 63

The group of experts consulted by Elections Canada through the Institute for Research on Public Policy (IRPP) were of the view that "data gathering by the parties is a good thing, as it allows them to better reach their supporter base." They also agreed that it may be time to consider extending privacy regimes to political entities. They were particularly concerned about data breaches and the lack of recourse that those affected by such breaches would have.^Footnote 64

The Chief Electoral Officer shares these views and recommends that political entities become subject to the broadly accepted privacy principles set out in the National Standard of Canada entitled Model Code for the Protection of Personal Information, CAN/CSA-Q830-96, also enumerated in Schedule 1 of the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (PIPEDA) and reproduced in the annex to this report. These general principles govern the collection, use, disclosure and retention of records. They include requirements for accountability mechanisms; for the consent, where appropriate, of the person whose personal information is collected, used or disclosed; and for proper safeguards. This change would go a long way to reassuring electors as to the use of their personal information by political entities and to increasing the level of trust in those entities.

One way of regulating the privacy practices of parties while reducing what could be perceived as intrusion by the state in their internal affairs would be to require parties to obtain an assurance from an external management auditor, attesting that the party has systems in place to protect the personal information of electors and that these systems respect the principles listed in the annex to this report. A party would need this assurance to continue to receive lists of electors from Elections Canada.

This assurance would also preserve the reputation of the political party and reassure electors as to the protection given to their personal information, particularly in the wake of events that took place in the last election. However, such a regime would be impracticable for political entities who are by nature temporary: candidates, leadership contestants and nomination contestants.

In order to mitigate the risk of voter information being misused by candidates or persons involved in candidates' campaigns, additional measures are required. It is recommended that the Act be amended so that parties that provide voter information to candidates are required to (a) take all reasonable means to restrict access to data, (b) inform the persons to whom the data is made accessible of the proper use of the data in accordance with instructions provided by the Chief Electoral Officer, and (c) demand that these persons not use or disclose the data for any other purpose, except as required by law. In case of misuse or loss by local campaigns of voter information obtained from the party, the party that provided access to the data would be liable unless it can show that it exercised due diligence in providing access to the voter information. This would be done by respecting the above requirements.

In the discussion paper published in November 2012, Elections Canada considered whether the Act should be amended to allow electors to opt out of receiving unsolicited calls from political entities by indicating this preference when registering or updating their information in the National Register of Electors.

While it is recognized that most Canadians (78%) would like to have this option,^Footnote 65 the panel of experts were strongly of the view that parties should continue to be allowed to contact voters.^Footnote 66 It is also noted that the Telecommunications Act already provides a mechanism to deal with this issue by having one's name added to the internal do not call list of a political entity. At this time, therefore, Elections Canada does not recommend such an amendment to the Act.

New requirements governing telecommunications with electors

Both the CRTC's Telemarketing Rules and Automatic Dialing-Announcing Device Rules, to which this report has previously referred, already apply to political entities with respect to some types of calls: live and automated calls for the purpose of solicitation. However, not all direct voter contacts are governed by the CRTC's Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules. For example, live calls that are not made for solicitation purposes are excluded. Moreover, under the Canada Elections Act, only those communications from political parties and candidates that constitute "advertising" require a statement regarding the authorization of the party's registered agent or the candidate's official agent.

The Act should provide that in the case of all messages from a political entity transmitted to a telephone, whether in the form of a live call or an automated pre-recorded call, the telephone number of the sponsor should be displayed on the call display of persons called, and should not be blocked from being displayed; the name of the sponsor of the call and the sponsor's party affiliation, if any, should be stated at the beginning of the message; the message should state whether the sponsor has authorized it; and the telephone number of the sponsor or the sponsor's campaign office at which the sponsor can be contacted should be stated at the end of the message.^Footnote 67 The Act should also provide for limitations similar to those contained in the CRTC's Unsolicited Telecommunications Rules regarding the time of day during which calls may be made. These rules should apply during as well as outside of election periods.

Increased reporting requirements

The following recommendation dealing with increased reporting is made to ensure that the recommended identification requirements are met and to further prevent the recurrence of deceptive communications.

The Act should be amended to provide for increased reporting requirements, not only for political parties but for all entities (i.e. electoral district associations, candidates, third parties), regarding the use of telemarketing communication services. This change would assist in ensuring compliance with the previous recommendation regarding telecommunications with electors. Additional information should include the text of messages, dates on which they were communicated to electors, and, if requested by the Chief Electoral Officer, the telephone numbers that were contacted. A strong majority of the participants convened by the IRPP to provide their advice to Elections Canada supported increasing the disclosure requirements of political entities, "in a push for more transparency."^Footnote 68

Building on a recommendation contained in a motion passed unanimously by the House of Commons on March 12, 2012,^Footnote 69 and on a proposal contained in Bill C-453 (a private member's bill introduced in the House of Commons on October 17, 2012), the agency recommends that parties and candidates also be required to advise the Chief Electoral Officer of the names and contact information of any person or entity they retain to provide voter contact services before or during an election, as soon as a contractual arrangement has been made with an outside organization (rather than possibly several months after the election). Such a requirement would also facilitate a more rapid investigation of allegations of improper calls.

Increase in the Chief Electoral Officer's audit tools

The following audit mechanism is recommended to better ensure compliance with the requirements of the Act and to ensure transparency.

The first element of the motion passed unanimously by the House of Commons was that Elections Canada's investigation capabilities be strengthened to give the Chief Electoral Officer the power to request all necessary documents from political parties and thus ensure compliance with the Act. This is similar to the proposal contained in the 2010 recommendations report, whereby the Chief Electoral Officer would be authorized to request that registered parties provide any documents and information that may, in the Chief Electoral Officer's opinion, be necessary to verify that the party and its chief agent have complied with the requirements of the Act with respect to election expenses returns. This tool could be used, for example, to obtain specific documents related to voter contacts from parties, as they are not required to submit any supporting documents with their return. As discussed in the recommendations report, this authority already exists in all provincial jurisdictions.^Footnote 70 This power would be available to the Chief Electoral Officer for administrative purposes, not for conducting penal investigations.

C. Recommendations to improve enforcement

Prohibition against impersonating an election official

Legislation adopted by Ontario in 2011^Footnote 71 creates a new offence for a person who, inside or outside Ontario, falsely represents himself or herself to be an employee or agent of the Ontario Office of the Chief Electoral Officer, a person appointed under the Election Act, a candidate or candidate's representative, or an authorized representative of a registered party or registered constituency association.

In the Ontario legislation, if a judge finds that the offence has been committed knowingly, the person is guilty of a corrupt practice and is liable to a fine of a maximum of $25,000, imprisonment for a maximum of two years less a day, or both.

While the offence in the Ontario statute applies to the person making the calls, the offence set out in paragraph 482(b) of the Canada Elections Act of inducing a person to vote or to refrain from voting by any pretence or contrivance would also apply to the originator of the scheme (that is, the person who directed the calls to be made).

That said, an offence similar to that of Ontario should be included in the Act not only for someone representing himself or herself as an employee or agent of Elections Canada, but also for a person falsely representing himself or herself as a candidate or candidate's representative, or as an authorized representative of a registered party or registered electoral district association. In both cases, proving the offence would not require evidence that the offender's conduct was aimed at interfering with the right to vote or at inducing electors not to vote for a particular candidate. It would be sufficient to show that the person falsely represented himself or herself. However, such an offence would need to be crafted so as to exclude bona fide political satire. This could be achieved by indicating that the false representation must be such that a person could reasonably be confused as to the impersonator's true identity.

Such an offence should be crafted broadly enough to include deceptive practices on the Internet, such as the abuse of campaign domain names and false campaign websites.

The recommended maximum amount of the fine ($250,000) or of imprisonment (five years) for both this new offence and for that set out in paragraph 482(b)^Footnote 72 is significantly higher than for most other offences in the Act. While this could create a discrepancy, Elections Canada is of the view that many offences under the Act should provide for higher sanctions than is currently the case, in order to have a more significant deterrent effect on offenders. Higher fines would send a message to all Canadians about the importance given by Parliament to maintaining the integrity of the electoral process. Elections Canada intends to submit a report in the spring of 2014 addressing these matters and making specific recommendations to Parliament.

Increase in the Commissioner of Canada Elections' investigation tools

Elections Canada strongly believes that the Act should be amended to provide additional mechanisms to assist the Commissioner in the gathering of evidence when there are allegations of offences contrary to the Act and, more particularly, allegations of improper calls having been made to electors.

As indicated earlier in the report, the inability to compel testimony is one of the most significant obstacles to effective enforcement of the Act. The Chief Electoral Officer strongly recommends that this power be given to the Commissioner to facilitate and accelerate the manner in which allegations are investigated.

While compliance with the Act is primarily ensured by way of offences, it is important to keep in mind that the Act is fundamentally of a regulatory nature. It sets out a number of rules, such as spending limits and reporting requirements, designed to establish a fair electoral process. The offences in the Act merely serve to better ensure compliance with those rules, and not to sanction conduct that is inherently reprehensible, as is the case with true criminal offences.

In other regulatory schemes, such as provincial securities legislation or the federal Competition Act, it is not uncommon for agencies responsible for ensuring compliance and conducting investigations to have the ability to require persons to provide information by way of testimony or records. Consistent with the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, information obtained in this manner cannot be used against those who are compelled to testify. The information may nevertheless be essential in determining whether a contravention has occurred and allowing for timely and effective enforcement or corrective action.

In the electoral context, several provincial statutes grant the chief electoral officer or commissioner, as the case may be, the power to compel persons to appear before them and provide testimonial evidence or produce records. This includes New Brunswick, Nova Scotia, Quebec, Ontario, Manitoba, Alberta and Yukon.^Footnote 73 Internationally, other electoral management bodies have this power. These include the Australian Electoral Commission^Footnote 74 and the Federal Election Commission of the United States.^Footnote 75

The role of the Commissioner with respect to compliance and enforcement of the Canada Elections Act is essential to ensuring a fair electoral process and preserving the democratic rights of Canadians under the Charter. Where the legitimacy of an election is questioned by allegations of breaches under the Act, it is in the public interest to uncover what took place in a manner that is as timely and effective as possible, in accordance with the rights of those that may be involved as well as the democratic rights of Canadians.

In order to achieve this balance, it is recommended that the Commissioner be granted powers similar to those found under section 11 of the Competition Act. ^Footnote 76 The Commissioner would be authorized to make an ex parte application to a judge to obtain an order providing that a person who has or is likely to have information regarding an investigation be examined under oath by the Commissioner or one of his or her representatives on any matter relevant to the investigation. The order could also require the person to produce documents. The examination would be conducted in private and any person required to be examined would have the right to be represented by counsel.

Prior to obtaining such an order, the Commissioner would have to satisfy a judge, on the basis of affidavit evidence, that an investigation is taking place and that the person to be examined has or is likely to have information that is directly relevant to the investigation. In all cases, information so obtained could not be used in support of a prosecution against the person who was required to provide it, except where the person has intentionally provided misleading evidence.

In this regard, to ensure that this power is effective, the Canada Elections Act should also include an offence for providing false information to the Commissioner or for obstructing an investigation. Similar offences exist in various provincial electoral statutes.^Footnote 77

The Commissioner of Canada Elections strongly supports this recommendation.

This recommendation is a variation of a provision contained in Bill C-453 for companies that provide telemarketing services to transmit documents to the Chief Electoral Officer within four months after the election. It is the agency's view that requiring all providers of telecommunication services to transmit this information to Elections Canada is not necessary. The purpose of this recommendation is to ensure that companies that provide telemarketing services keep records for a period long enough for the information to remain available to investigators for a reasonable period of time (in this case, a minimum of one year).

The records to be kept cover all communications made in Canada, and not just those made for election purposes. For this reason, these records should not be forwarded to Elections Canada, but only retained by the companies. They would only be shared with the Commissioner following judicial authorization through a production order issued pursuant to the authority described in the previous recommendation (that is, if a judge is satisfied, on the basis of affidavit evidence, that an investigation is taking place and that the person to be examined has or is likely to have information that is directly related to the investigation).

The privacy of Canadians is only minimally affected by the production of records held by telemarketers. Indeed, in most cases, the only personal information that would be disclosed is the fact that they received a call from a telemarketing firm as well as the message used by the firm.

In investigations dealing with deceptive practices, the Commissioner (or individuals acting on the Commissioner's behalf) should have the authority to require telecommunications companies to preserve specified computer records in their possession or control when such a demand is made. This would protect the information from being disposed of by the telecommunications companies as part of their normal business practices.

Investigators could only make such demands if the Commissioner had reasonable grounds to suspect (a) that an offence involving deceptive communications with electors was (or will be) committed under the Act, (b) that the computer record is in the possession or under the control of the person to which the demand is made, and (c) that the record would assist in the investigation of the offence. A demand would not require judicial authorization but would only be valid for a limited duration (e.g. 90 days), until a production order has been obtained from a judge.

However, in order for such a mechanism to be useful, the Commissioner would need to know in advance details regarding the telecommunication service providers of candidates and political parties. Currently, this information is not available with respect to parties. With respect to candidates, it only becomes known to Elections Canada once the candidates file their financial returns, which are due four months after polling day. Accordingly, as discussed above, candidates and parties should be required to report information on their telecommunication service providers (including phone and Internet account numbers) as soon as a contract is signed or an arrangement concluded, during or before the election period.

D. Suggestions that were not pursued

Before concluding, it is worth addressing a few suggestions that were not pursued.

In the course of drafting this report, Elections Canada received a number of suggestions from parties or experts regarding means of preventing the type of situation that occurred in the 2011 general election or facilitating the detection of guilty individuals or groups. After reviewing them, some were set aside as out of scope, not practical, too complex to implement or simply not applicable in the context of the electoral process. In this context, two of these suggestions are worth mentioning.

Granting the Chief Electoral Officer the power to cancel an election or to apply to a court for it to cancel the election

The Chief Electoral Officer is tasked with administering the electoral process. His or her role is and must remain that of a neutral and impartial arbitrator. The suggestion that the Chief Electoral Officer should be authorized to apply to a court to have an election cancelled – or worse, have the power to cancel the election – would irremediably damage this arbitrator role. This is because the exercise of such a power would require that the Chief Electoral Officer take sides by being for or against one of the participants in the election contest. Applying to a court to seek the cancellation of an election is the responsibility of those who fought in that election or who, as electors, had a stake in the election. This should remain the case.

Providing for the possibility of rewarding whistleblowers

It is already possible for anyone who believes that an offence has been committed under the Canada Elections Act to report the matter to the Commissioner of Canada Elections, for him or her to investigate the matter as he or she deems necessary in the circumstances and to take the measures he or she considers appropriate for dealing with the offence if one was committed.

It has been suggested, however, that the probability of someone providing information on an offender is much greater if there is a financial incentive for the informer to denounce the alleged illegal act. For that reason, a whistleblower regime that provides a financial reward to the person who provides information on an illegal act is seen as a more effective deterrence measure than relying strictly on informers who denounce illegal acts for purposes other than money. The agency was referred to the whistleblower program available under the United States Securities Exchange Act of 1934.^Footnote 78 Under that program, the Securities and Exchange Commission is authorized to reward the assistance and information provided from a whistleblower who knows of possible securities law violations. The legislation underpinning the program provides that the rewards are paid from a fund in which are deposited the fines imposed on offenders.

The website of the best-known Canadian whistleblower program that provides for such payments, Crime Stoppers, indicates that rewards for information that helps the police solve crimes are funded exclusively by donations from private citizens and local businesses.^Footnote 79 A source of funds over which the Chief Electoral Officer would have some control would have to be generated for the payment of rewards under the Canada Elections Act. Furthermore, there is no whistleblower regime in Canadian federal legislation that provides for the payment of a reward to the whistleblower.^{Footnote >80} The electoral process does not appear to be the best context for such a regime, as nothing indicates a lack of denunciations by participants in the electoral process or by Canadians in general.

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Return to source of ^{Footnote 48} Phoenix, Survey of Electors, p. 5.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 49} While in certain fields distinctions are made between a code of ethics and a code of conduct, for the purpose of this report, the two terms are used interchangeably unless referring to specific codes.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 50} Canada, Royal Commission on Electoral Reform and Party Financing, Reforming Electoral Democracy, vol. 1 (Ottawa: Communication Group, 1991) (Chair: Pierre Lortie), p. 285.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 51} Id., p. 286.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 52} Id., p. 287.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 53} Id., p. 288.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 54} Id., p. 289.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 55} International IDEA is an intergovernmental organization. Its programs aim to provide knowledge to democracy builders, provide policy development and analysis, and support democratic reform.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 56} International IDEA, Code of Conduct for Political Parties – Campaigning in Democratic Elections, www.idea.int/publications/coc_campaigning/loader.cfm?csmodule=security/getfile&pageid=2401, 1999, p. 7. A study prepared for the Inter-Parliamentary Union (of which Canada is a member) by Guy S. Goodwin-Gill also proposes a model code directed at political entities. See Codes of Conduct for Elections: A Study Prepared for the Inter-Parliamentary Union, www.ipu.org/PDF/publications/CODES_E.pdf, 1998, at p. 59ff.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 57} International IDEA, Code of Conduct for Political Parties – Campaigning in Democratic Elections, pp. 8–9.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 58} Id., p. 6.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 59} Id., p. 10. See also Goodwin-Gill's study at pp. 64 and 67.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 60} See the launch of Ghana's Political Parties Code of Conduct for the 2012 elections, www.modernghana.com/news/366561/1/political-parties-code-of-conduct-for-2012-launche.html; see also Zambia's code of conduct issued and administered by the Electoral Commission, www.elections.org.zm/media/electoral_code_of_conduct_2011.pdf. Political parties in a number of countries in Africa have adopted similar codes, with the support and encouragement of the Electoral Institute for Sustainable Democracy in Africa (EISA). See www.eisa.org.za/WEP/comcode.htm. India's Election Commission has also published a model code of conduct for the guidance of political parties. See http://eci.nic.in/eci_main/faq/faq_mcc.pdf.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 61} See Manitoba's Shared Code of Ethical Conduct at www.electionsmanitoba.ca/en/Political_Participation/
Shared_Ethical_Code_of_Conduct.html. It was developed as a result of a recommendation contained in the 1999 report of a commission of inquiry that looked into allegations of offences under the province's Elections Act and Elections Finances Act during Manitoba's 1995 general election. The code, which applies to all political parties and candidates, provides guiding principles and rules of conduct. Respect for the law by all those to which the code applies is emphasized, as well as the need for political entities to uphold the integrity of the political process. The code is administered by each political party.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 62} Phoenix, Survey of Electors, p. 7.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 63} Id., p. 9.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 64} IRPP, Roundtable Report, pp. 5–6.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 65} Phoenix, Survey of Electors, p. 7.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 66} IRPP, Roundtable Report, p. 12.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 67} These rules now exist for advertisements in the Alberta Election Act at subsection 134(3) as amended by the Election Accountability Amendment Act, 2012. It is proposed that they apply to all telecommunications from political entities.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 68} IRPP, Roundtable Report, p. 8.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 69} Canada, House of Commons, Journals, 41st Parliament, 1st session, no. 94, March 12, 2012.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 70} Election Act, R.S.B.C. 1996, c. 106, s. 276; Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-2, s. 5; Election Act, 1996, S.S. 1996, c. E-6.01, s. 280; Election Financing Act, C.C.S.M., c. E27, s. 67; Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7, s. 7; Election Act, R.S.Q., c. E-3.3, s. 118; Elections Act, S.N.S. 2011, c. 5, s. 221; Political Process Financing Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. P-9.3, s. 16; Election Expenses Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-2.01, s. 6; Elections Act, 1991, S.N.L. 1992, c. E-3.1, s. 275.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 71} An Act to amend the Election Act with respect to certain electoral practices, S.O. 2011, c. 17.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 72} A person currently found guilty of the offence set out in paragraph 482(b) is liable on summary conviction to a fine of not more than $2,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than one year, or to both; or, on conviction on indictment, to a fine of not more than $5,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than five years, or to both (see subsection 500(5)).

Return to source of ^{Footnote 73} Section 494 of Quebec's Election Act, R.S.Q, c. E-3.3, vests Quebec's chief electoral officer, with respect to his or her own investigations, with the powers and immunities of a commissioner appointed under Quebec's statute respecting public inquiry commissions (c. C-37). This includes the power described above (section 9). The same goes for the chief electoral officers of Nova Scotia (Elections Act, S.N.S. 2011, c. 5, s. 286; Public Inquiries Act, R.S., c. 372, s. 5), New Brunswick (Political Process Financing Act, S.N.B. 1978, c. P-9.3, s. 16), Ontario (Election Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.6, s. 4.0.1; Election Finances Act, R.S.O. 1990, c. E.7, s. 3; Public Inquiries Act, S.O. 2009, c. 33, Schedule 6, s. 33), Manitoba (Elections Act, C.C.S.M., c. E30, s. 186(5)), Yukon (Elections Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 63, s. 351; Public Inquiries Act, R.S.Y. 2002, c. 177, ss. 4 and 5) and Alberta (Election Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-1, s. 4.2 and Election Finances and Contributions Disclosure Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. E-2, s. 5, both as amended by the Election Accountability Amendment Act, 2012; Public Inquiries Act, R.S.A. 2000, c. P-39, s. 4).

Return to source of ^{Footnote 74} See Commonwealth Electoral Act 1918, s. 316.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 75} These powers of the Commission are set out at sections 437d (a)(3) and (4) of Chapter 14 of Title 2 of the United States code. See www.fec.gov/law/feca/feca.pdf.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 76} Competition Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. C-34.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 77} Saskatchewan Election Act, 1996, S.S. 1996, c. E-6.01, s. 283; Manitoba Elections Act, C.C.S.M., c. E30, s. 183(7); Nova Scotia Elections Act, S.N.S. 2011, c. 5, s. 334; Prince Edward Island Election Expenses Act, R.S.P.E.I. 1988, c. E-2.01, s. 28; Newfoundland and Labrador Elections Act, 1991, S.N.L. 1992, c. E-3.1, s. 323.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 78} See "Securities Whistleblower Incentives and Protection" in Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., sec. 21F.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 79} http://crimestoppers.ca/donate/.

Return to source of ^{Footnote 80} See section 66.1 of the Competition Act and section 27 of PIPEDA for examples of whistleblower provisions in federal law. As well, see the Public Servants Disclosure Protection Act, S.C. 2005, c. 46.